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Classic social psychology studies demonstrate that people can behave in ways that contradict their intentionsespecially within the moral domain.
We measured brain activity while subjects decided between financial self-benefit (earning money) and preventing physical harm (applying an electric
shock) to a confederate under both real and hypothetical conditions. We found a shared neural network associated with empathic concern for both types
of decisions. However, hypothetical and real moral decisions also recruited distinct neural circuitry: hypothetical moral decisions mapped closely onto
the imagination network, while real moral decisions elicited activity in the bilateral amygdala and anterior cingulateareas essential for social and
affective processes. Moreover, during real moral decision-making, distinct regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) determined whether subjects make
selfish or pro-social moral choices. Together, these results reveal not only differential neural mechanisms for real and hypothetical moral decisions but
also that the nature of real moral decisions can be predicted by dissociable networks within the PFC.
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INTRODUCTION
Psychology has a long tradition demonstrating a fundamental differ-
ence between how people believe they will act and how they actually act
in the real world (Milgram, 1963; Higgins, 1987). Recent research
(Ajzen et al., 2004; Kang et al., 2011; Teper et al., 2011) has confirmed
this intention–behavior discrepancy, revealing that people inaccurately
predict their future actions because hypothetical decision-making re-
quires mental simulations that are abbreviated, unrepresentative and
decontextualized (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). This ‘hypothetical bias’
effect (Kang et al., 2011) has routinely demonstrated that the influence
of socio-emotional factors and tangible risk (Wilson et al., 2000) is
relatively diluted in hypothetical decisions: not only do hypothetical
moral probes lack the tension engendered by competing, real-world
emotional choices but also they fail to elicit expectations of conse-
quencesboth of which are endemic to real moral reasoning (Krebs
et al., 1997). In fact, research has shown that when real contextual
pressures and their associated consequences come into play, people
can behave in characteristically immoral ways (Baumgartner et al.,
2009; Greene and Paxton, 2009). Although there is also important
work examining the neural basis of the opposite behavioral findingal-
truistic decision-making (Moll et al., 2006)the neural networks
underlying the conflicting motivation of maximizing self-gain at the
expense of another are still poorly understood.
Studying the neural architecture of this form of moral tension is
particularly compelling because monetary incentives to behave immor-
ally are pervasive throughout societypeople frequently cheat on their
loved ones, steal from their employers or harm others for monetary
gain. Moreover, we reasoned that any behavioral and neural disparities
between real and hypothetical moral reasoning will likely have the
sharpest focus when two fundamental proscriptionsdo not harm
others and do not over-benefit the self at the expense of others
(Haidt, 2007)are directly pitted against one another. In other
words, we speculated that this prototypical moral conflict would pro-
vide an ideal test-bed to examine the behavioral and neural differences
between intentions and actions.
Accordingly, we used a ‘your pain, my gain’ (PvG) laboratory task
(FeldmanHall et al., 2012) to operationalize this core choice between
personal advantage and another’s welfare: subjects were probed about
their willingness to receive money (up to £200) by physically harming
(via electric stimulations) another subject (Figure 1A). The juxtapos-
ition of these two conflicting motivations requires balancing selfish
needs against the notion of ‘doing the right thing’ (Blair, 2007). We
carried out a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experi-
ment using the PvG task to first explore if real moral behavior mirrors
hypothetical intention, and second, to examine if these two classes of
behavior are subserved by the same neural architecture. We hypothe-
sized that people would imagine doing one thing, but when faced with
real monetary incentive, do anotherand that this behavioral differ-
ence would be reflected at the neurobiological level with differential
patterns of activity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Fourteen healthy subjects took part in this study: six males; mean age
and s.d. 25.9 4.6, completed a Real PvG, Imagine PvG and a
Non-Moral control task in a within-subject design while undergoing
fMRI. Four additional subjects were excluded from analyzes due to
expressing doubts about the veracity of the Real PvG task on a
post-scan questionnaire and during debriefing. Two additional sub-
jects were not included because of errors in acquiring scanning images.
Subjects were compensated for their time and travel and allowed to
keep any earnings accumulated during the task. All subjects were
right-handed, had normal or corrected vision and were screened to
ensure no history of psychiatric or neurological problems. All subjects
gave informed consent, and the study was approved by the University
of Cambridge, Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee.
Experimental tasks
Real pain vs gain task (Real PvG)
In the Real PvG subjects (Deciders) were given £20 and asked how
much of their money they were willing to give up to prevent a series of
painful electric stimulations from reaching the wrist of the second
subject (the Receivera confederate). The more money the Decider
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chose to relinquish, the lower the painful stimulations inflicted on the
Receiver, the key behavioral variable being how much money Deciders
kept (with larger amounts indicating that personal gain was prioritized
over Receiver’s pain). The task comprised a series of eight screens per
trial across 20 trials. Each trial began with a screen displaying the
running amount of the subject’s bank total (£20 on Trial 1) and cur-
rent trial number. Subjects then had up to 11 s to decide upon and use
a visual analogue scale (VAS) to select the amount of money they
wanted to spend on that trial (up to £1) and thus the corresponding
painful stimulation to be administered to the Receiver. This 11-s phase
was partitioned into the ‘Decide’ and ‘Select’ periods. The Decide
screen was presented for a fixed 3 s during which subjects were asked
to think about their decision, so that when the select screen appeared,
subjects could move the cursor to make their selection any time within
the next 8 s. This design was used in order to introduce a variable jitter
within the trial sequence. After making a selection, subjects saw a 3-s
display of their choice before experiencing an 8-s anticipation
phaseduring which subjects were told their choice was being trans-
mitted over the internal network to the other testing laboratory where
the Receiver was connected to the electric stimulation generator.
Following this anticipation period, subjects viewed a 4-s video of the
stimulation being administered (Video event) to the Receiver, or no
stimulation if they had opted to spend the full £1 permitted on a given
trial. Subjects viewed a video feed of the Receiver’s hand during stimu-
lation administration. Finally, subjects used a 13-point VAS to rate
their distress levels on viewing the consequences of their decision,
before viewing a 4-s inter-trial-interval. At the conclusion of the 20
trials, subjects were able to press a button to randomly multiply any
remaining money between 1 and 10 times, thus giving a maximum
possible financial gain of £200. (See Supplementary Materials for de-
scriptions of the Imagine PvG and Non-Moral tasks.)
Imaging methods
MRI scanning was conducted at the Medical Research Council
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit on a 3-Tesla Trio Tim MRI scanner
by using a head coil gradient set. Whole-brain data were acquired with
echoplanar T2*-weighted imaging (EPI), sensitive to BOLD signal con-
trast (48 sagittal slices, 3 mm thickness; Repetition Time
(TR)¼ 2400 ms; Time to Echo (TE)¼ 30 ms; flip angle¼ 788; Field
of View (FOV)¼ 192 mm). To provide for equilibration effects, the
first seven volumes were discarded. T1-weighted structural images
were acquired at a resolution of 1 1 1 mm. Statistical parametric
mapping software was used to analyze all data. Pre-processing of fMRI
data included spatial realignment, co-registration, normalization and
smoothing. To control for motion, all functional volumes were re-
aligned to the mean volume. Images were spatially normalized to
standard space using the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) tem-
plate with a voxel size of 3 3 3 mm and smoothed using a Gaussian
kernel with an isotropic full width at half maximum of 8 mm. In
Fig. 1 Experimental setup, trial sequence (highlighting analyzed epochs) and behavioral data: (A) The Receiver (a confederate) sits in an adjoining testing laboratory to the scanning facility where the Decider
(true subject) is undergoing fMRI. The Decider is told that any money left at the end of the task will be randomly multiplied up to 10 times, giving Deciders as much as £200 to take home. The Decider is also
required to view, via prerecorded video feed, the administration of any painful stimulation to the Receiver, who is hooked up to an electric stimulation generator. (B) All three tasks (Real PvG, Imagine PvG and
Non-Moral task) follow the same event-related design, with the same structure and timing parameters. Our analytical focus was on the Decide event (>11 s). The Video event (4 s), which was spaced a fixed
11 s after the Decide event, was also used in the analysis. (C) Still images of each task illustrating the video the Decider saw while in the scanner: Real PvG video, Imagine PvG video, and Non-Moral video,
respectively. VAS scale Deciders used to indicate amount of money to give up/stimulation to deliver per trial. (D) Significantly more Money Kept in the Real PvG Task as compared to the Imagine PvG Task
(P¼ 0.025; error bars¼ 1 S.E.M). (E) No significant differences between distress levels in response to the Video event across moral tasks.
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addition, high-pass temporal filtering with a cutoff of 128 s was applied
to remove low-frequency drifts in signal.
Statistical analysis
After pre-processing, statistical analysis was performed using the gen-
eral linear model (GLM). Analysis was carried out to establish each
participant’s voxel-wise activation during the following events: making
the decision of how much money to keep/which stimulations to ad-
minister (Decide event; Figure 1B) and watching the stimulation be
administered (Video event; Figure 1B). Activated voxels were identified
using an event-related statistical model representing each of the ex-
perimental events, convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function and mean-corrected. Six head-motion parameters defined by
the realignment were added to the model as regressors of no interest.
For each fMRI experiment, contrast images for the Decide and Video
events were calculated using GLMs and separately entered into full
factorial analyses of variances (ANOVAs).
For group statistics, ANOVAs were used. For all three tasks (Real
PvG, Imagine PvG and Non-Moral), the Decide event and the Video
event were used in the following contrasts: (i) Real PvG > Imagine
PvG, (ii) Imagine PvG > Real PvG and (iii) Real PvG > Non-Moral.
A parametric regression analysis was used to explore which brain re-
gions showed a correlation with Money Kept across the Real PvG task.
We used a 1–6 parametric regressor weighted to the money chosen per
trialcorresponding to the VAS scale used during the Decide event
(Figure 1C). No significant activity was found for a parametric regres-
sion analysis for the Imagine PvG task. We report activity at P< 0.001
uncorrected for multiple spatial comparisons across the whole brain
and P< 0.05 Family Wise Error (FWE) corrected for the following a
priori regions of interest (ROIs; attained by independent coordinates):
anterior insula, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), medial and
dorso-medial PFC (mPFC; dmPFC), hippocampus, temporoparietal
junction (TPJ), amygdala and dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC). Coordinates
were taken from previous related studies1.
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Our study was motivated by the observation that moral action does
not always reflect moral principle. Based on this, we anticipated that
when the opportunity for making real money was salient, participants
would favor financial self-interest (at the expense of the Receiver’s
pain) more during the real condition when compared with the hypo-
thetical condition. This prediction was confirmed with subjects keep-
ing significantly more money in the Real (£15.77, s.d. 3.56) vs
Imagine PvG task (£14.45, s.d. 2.94; t¼ 2.52; P¼ 0.025; paired sam-
ples t-test, two-tailed; Figure 1D). Importantly, subjects showed no
obvious strategy acquisition effects for keeping money over time (see
Supplementary Analysis for details). There was no significant correl-
ation between their ratings of the believability of the task and their
behavioral performance (Money Kept), r¼ –0.22, P> 0.1.
Furthermore, amount of Money Kept could not be explained by sub-
jects modifying their decisions in response to reputation management
or feelings of being watched (Landsberger, 1958; r¼ 0.284; P¼ 0.325,
see Supplementary Methods for details). Self-reported distress ratings
following the viewing of the Video event revealed that the Real PvG
was no more distressing than imagining the painful stimulations in the
Imagine PvG task (t¼ 0.13; P¼ 0.89; paired samples t-test, two-tailed;
Figure 1E). This suggests that the emotional manipulation of watching
an aversive video of the moral decision (when compared with viewing
a blue screen and simulating the feedback of the decision) had no
differential effect on participants’ distress. There was, however, a sig-
nificant difference between the distress levels reported in the Real PvG
compared with the Non-Moral task (t¼ –2.29; P¼ 0.039; paired sam-
ples t-test, 2 tailed; Figure 1E).
Imaging results
Real moral vs non-moral decisions
In line with the traditional research (Greene et al., 2001), we first
compared moral decisions in the Real PvG to decisions in the
Non-Moral task, which revealed bilateral amygdala and anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC; the Decide event in the Real PvG contrasted with
the Decide event in the Non-Moral Task [Table 1])two regions that
are known to process emotionally aversive stimuli (Bechara et al.,
2003), especially during emotional conflict (Etkin et al., 2011). That
decisions made during the Real PvG reveal patterns of activation
within emotion processing areas likely reflects the fact that moral de-
cisions are more emotionally arousing than decisions made within a
non-moral context.
Real and hypothetical decisions
To specifically elucidate the differences between real and hypothetical
moral decisions, we compared the Decide event (Figure 1B) for the
Imagine and Real PvG tasks, highlighting the brain regions distinct to
each condition. Significant activation in the PCC, bilateral hippocam-
pus and posterior parietal lobeall regions essential in imagination and
prospection (Schacter et al., 2007)were greater for hypothetical moral
decisions (Figure 2A). Applying a priori ROIs derived from research on
the brain’s construction system (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009) revealed
a remarkably shared neural system with hypothetical moral decisions
(Table 2). Additional a priori ROIs drawn from the moral literature
mPFC and dlPFC (Greene et al., 2001)also showed greater activation
for imagined moral choices. Parameter estimates of the beta values for
these ROIs confirmed that these regions were more sensitive to hypo-
thetical moral decisions, relative to real moral decisions (Figure 2A). In
contrast, activation in the bilateral ventral TPJ [BA 37], bilateral amyg-
dala, putamen and ACC were more active for real moral decisions
(Figure 2B; Table 3). As with the previous contrast, we first applied
a priori ROIs and then examined the parameter estimates to ensure
that the amygdala and TPJ were significantly more active during real
moral decisions. These regions are well documented within the social
neuroscience literature and have been closely associated with process-
ing stimuli with emotional and social significance (Phelps, 2006).
Table 1 Decide event of Real PvG contrasted to Non-Moral task (Real PvG Decide >
Non-Moral PvG Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Right ACC 14 38 28 3.12
Left amygdala 26 2 26 3.00
Right amygdala 28 8 28 3.00
Right fusiform 28 64 10 3.49
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
Right amygdalaa 28 4 26 3.61
Left amygdalaa 20 6 26 3.39
ROI¼ regions of interest with 6 mm sphere corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent
coordinates from previous study: aAkitsuki and Decety (2009).
1We used a priori coordinates to define ROI in our analysis. All ROIs were selected on the basis of independent
coordinates using a sphere of 6-10 mm (sphere size was defined by the corresponding structure) and corrected at
P < 0.05 FWE and were attained through MarsBaRs. Peak voxels are presented in the tables at P < 0.001
uncorrected and images are shown at P < 0.005 uncorrected.
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Shared moral networks
We ran a conjunction analysis of all moral decisions to determine if
there is a common neural circuitry between real and hypothetical
moral decisions (real moral decisions compared with non-moral deci-
sions, along with imagined moral decisions compared with non-moral
decisions (Real PvG Decideþ Imagine PvG Decide). The results re-
vealed that moral decisions, regardless of condition, shared common
activation patterns in the bilateral insula (extending posterior to an-
terior), middle cingulate (MCC), bilateral dlPFC and bilateral TPJ
extending into the posterior superior temporal sulcus (BA 40which
differs from the peak coordinates found for real moral decisions;
Figure 2C; Table 4).
Real vs imagine feedback
Although subjects’ distress ratings across moral tasks were not signifi-
cantly different [F(1) < 1, P ¼ 0.99 (Figure 1E)], we wanted to first
ensure that the video feedback event in the Real PvG was not driving
activation during the Decision event and then examine the Deciders’
Fig. 2 Real and Imagine Moral networks: (A) Imagine Moral Network: Comparing the Imagine PvG Decide event > Real PvG Decide event reveals significant activation in the PCC, mPFC, posterior parietal cortex,
superior frontal sulcus and hippocampus. A priori ROIs (indicated by circles and corrected at P < 0.05 FWE) and parameter estimates reveal that hypothetical moral decisions map closely onto the brain’s
construction system. (B). Real Moral Network: Contrasting the Decide event of the Real PvG > Imagine PvG activates bilateral TPJ and amygdala. A priori ROIs and parameter estimates for these regions were
found to be more significant during the Real decision than during the Imagine decision. (C). Shared Moral Network: A conjunction analysis of Real and Imagine moral decisions reveals robust activation in the
empathy for pain matrix, and parameter estimates of the middle cingulate and bilateral insula illustrate comparable activations for both conditions. All coordinates in MNI space and results portrayed on sections
of the mean structural scan at P < 0.005 uncorrected. Both whole brain analysis (P < 0.001 uncorrected) and a priori regions of interest (FWE P < 0.05) were used for all contrasts. A complete list of activated
areas and ROIs can be found in Tables 2–4.
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socio-affective engagement with the task. Accordingly, we compared
neural activation during the Video feed event (Figure 1B) and pre-
dicted greater anterior insula activation indexing empathy for pain
(Singer et al., 2004) in the Real PvG when compared with the
Imagine PvG. As we expected, a comparison analysis of the Video
event for the Real vs Imagine PvG (Table 5) revealed greater bilateral
anterior insula activation when participants watched real administra-
tions of painful stimulations. This further supports the
well-documented proposal that the anterior insula codes for the em-
pathic experience of another’s pain (Singer et al., 2004) and suggests
that participants experienced greater socio-affective engagement in the
Real version of the task.
Self-interested vs pro-social behavior
One strength of the use of multiple trials in the PvG task is that it gives
Deciders the option to either maintain a purely black (keep £20; maxi-
mize shocks) or white (keep £0; remove shocks) moral stance, or
to position themselves somewhere within the moral ‘gray area’
(£0 < keep < £20). This not only has ecological validity, reflecting peo-
ple’s tendency to qualify moral decisions but also allows us to inves-
tigate brain regions associated with different shades of ‘moral gray.’ We
therefore conducted a parametric regression analysis and found that
increasingly self-interested behavior on the Real PvG task (when
Deciders kept more money, parametrically weighted on a scale from
1 to 6) was associated with increased activity in the dorsal ACC
(dACC), bilateral dlPFC and orbital frontal cortex (OFC; Figure 3A;
Table 2 Decide event of Imagine PvG contrasted to Real PvG (Imagine PvG Decide > Real
Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Right hippocampus 34 30 4 5.70
Left hippocampus 32 18 10 3.80
Right posterior parietal cortex 42 66 38 5.39
Right occipital lobe 6 94 24 5.45
Right PCC 8 32 38 4.10
rACC/MFG 4 44 6 5.02
Right mid temporal lobe 64 38 10 5.10
Left mid temporal lobe 60 48 6 4.48
Left dlPFC 18 32 42 4.26
MCC 8 46 16 46 4.08
Left caudate 18 10 20 3.95
Right putamen 28 18 6 5.20
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
vmPFCa 3 24 9 3.78
Right superior frontal sulcusa 27 27 45 3.78
Right hippocampusa 21 24 12 6.81
Left parahippocampus gyrusa 18 35 15 7.80
Right parahippocampus gyrusa 0 33 42 12 6.77
Left posterior parietal cortexa 48 78 24 3.80
Right posterior parietal cortexa 45 55 24 4.56
mPFCb 1 53 22 3.80
dlPFCb 44 36 28 5.08
Left angular gyrusb 48 68 25 4.09
Right angular gyrusb 50 60 28 4.33
PCCb 4 57 36 4.13
ROI¼ regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aHassabis et al. (2007); bGreene et al. (2001).
Table 4 Conjunction analysis of all moral decisions (Real PvG Decideþ Imagine PvG
Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Visual cortex 10 86 16 7.55
Right insula 52 12 6 5.84
Left insula 52 12 2 4.51
Right TPJ 64 36 30 5.15
Left TPJ 60 33 20 4.02
Mid cingulate 8 2 42 6.67
Right dlPFC 32 44 28 3.91
Left dlPFC 34 42 26 3.92
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
Right anterior insulaa 60 15 3 7.27
Left anterior insulaa 48 12 2 7.85
ACCa 9 6 42 8.47
Left TPJb 53 71 6 10.34
Right TPJb 50 75 9 4.60
Right TPJ/Angular gyrusc 50 56 20 3.59
ROI¼ regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aSinger et al. (2004); bBorg et al (2006); cGreene et al. (2001).
Table 3 Decide event of Real PvG contrasted to Imagine PvG (Real PvG Decide > Imagine
Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Left TPJ 44 74 0 6.58
Right TPJ 46 68 2 6.44
dlPFC 54 22 6 4.62
SMA 46 18 62 4.19
Left amygdala 30 10 18 4.15
Right amygdala 26 10 18 4.11
ACC 16 40 26 3.98
Thalmus/STA region 10 12 10 3.97
Right anterior insula 28 32 8 3.23
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
Left TPJa 53 71 6 10.34
Right TPJa 50 75 9 10.43
Right amygdalab 28 4 26 4.85
Left amygdalab 20 6 26 3.32
ROI¼ regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous studies: aBorg et al. (2006); bAkitsuki and Decety (2009).
Table 5 Video event of Real PvG contrasted to Imagine PvG (Real PvG Video > Imagine
PvG video)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Right TPJ 52 58 4 5.15
Left TPJ 52 68 4 5.34
Right anterior insula 50 18 10 4.60
Right anterior insula 38 24 6 4.05
Left anterior insula 28 12 18 3.54
Left anterior insula 33 20 6 3.00
Mid cingulate 8 32 44 3.38
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
Right anterior insulaa 60 15 3 5.72
Right anterior insulaa 39 12 3 4.53
Right anterior insulaa 42 27 6 4.84
ROI¼ regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous study; aSinger et al. (2004).
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Table 6), regions sensitive to cognitive control (Ochsner and Gross,
2005) reward (Kringelbach, 2005) and, in particular, monetary gain
(O’Doherty et al., 2001). Activations associated with decreasing
self-interest (pro-social behavior) were predominately localized to
the mPFC/rostral ACC (rACC), temporal pole and anterior insula
(Figure 3B; Table 7; parametric regressions run on the Imagine PvG
did not reveal any similar regions). Critically, these parametric analyses
also clarified that the activations found during real moral decisions
(regardless of the nature of the decision) were not simply an effect of
reward classification for monetary gain or loss.
Individual differences
To test for potential motivating factors driving the selfish and
pro-social behavior found in the Real PvG, we explored individual
differences. Using post-scan questionnaires scores as covariates in a
correlated regression for the Real PvG Decision event revealed
differential activations for empathic concern and perspective taking
(Davis, 1983) and self-reported similarity ratings. Subgenual ACC cor-
related with increased empathic concern (Table 8) while decreasing
empathic concern and perspective-taking activated left putamen,
dACC, bilateral dlPFC and bilateral OFC (Table 9). Finally, similarity
ratings negatively correlated with the amount of Money Kept and
elicited activation in the right anterior insula, while increasing simi-
larity ratings correlated with activation in the ACC mPFC, dmPFC and
left OFC (Tables 10 and 11, respectively).
DISCUSSION
This study examined the moral dynamic of self-gain vs other-welfare
during real and hypothetical conditions. Our behavioral results show
that moral decisions with real consequences diverge from hypothetical
Fig. 3 Dissociable networks for real selfish and pro-social moral decisions (A) Parametric regression analysis (trial-by-trial) of the Decide event of the Real PvG for increasingly selfish behaviors (greater Money
Kept) activates the dACC, bilateral OFC and bilateral dlPFC. A priori ROIs (indicated by circles and corrected at P < 0.05 FWE) were found to be significantly activated for these regions. (B) Parametric regression
analysis of the Real PvG Decide event for increasingly pro-social decisions (greater money given up) reveals significant activation in the rostral ACC/mPFC, right temporal pole and right anterior insula. An a priori
ROI for the rACC corrected at P < 0.05 FWE was found to be significantly activated. All results portrayed on both axial sections and rendered images at P < 0.005 uncorrected. Both whole brain analysis
(P < 0.001 uncorrected) and a priori regions of interest (FWE P < 0.05) were used for all contrasts. All coordinates in MNI space: a complete list of activated areas and ROIs can be found in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6 Parametric modulation weighted by monetary choice for Real PvG Selfish
Decisions (Real PvG Decide, weighted 1–6)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Right mid frontal gyrus/dlPFC 28 38 48 3.62
Right inferior OFC 40 46 0 3.58
dACC 10 26 38 3.25
Left mid frontal gyrus 32 12 28 3.16
Left dlPFC 30 8 52 3.47
Right dlPFC 28 10 52 3.20
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
dmPFCa 0 24 40 3.61
Middle frontal gyrusa 24 2 52 4.04
Left frontal polea 36 50 10 3.39
ACCa 6 24 34 3.72
ROI¼ regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous study; aLiu et al. (2011)
Table 7 Parametric modulation weighted by monetary choice for Real PvG Pro-Social
Decisions (Real PvG Decide, weighted 1–6)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Right cuneus 14 -82 28 3.96
MFG/rACC 12 46 6 3.00
Left TPJ 64 38 20 3.00
Left temporal pole 48 14 30 3.00
Left anterior insula 38 12 12 2.85
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
MFG/rACCa 16 49 9 3.33
ROI¼ regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous study: aTakahashi et al. (2004).
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moral choices, verifying the ‘hypothetical bias’ effect (Kang et al.,
2011). Compared with imagining their moral actions, people who
make moral decisions under real conditions keep more money and
inflict more pain on another subject. Although the research exploring
real moral action is limited (Moll et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2009;
Greene and Paxton, 2009), our results stand in stark contrast to find-
ings demonstrating that people act more morally than they think they
will (Teper et al., 2011). Our results also contradict the accumulated
research illustrating a basic aversion to harming others (Greene et al.,
2001; Cushman et al., 2012). We contend that this is likely due to the
fact that many of the moral scenarios used within the moral literature
do not pit the fundamental motivation of not harming others (phys-
ically or psychological) against that of maximizing self-gain (Haidt,
2007). Accordingly, our findings reveal that engaging the complex
motivations of self-benefita force endemic to many moral deci-
sionscan critically influence moral action.
Our fMRI results identify a common neural network for real and
hypothetical moral cognition, as well as distinct circuitry specific to
real and imagined moral choices. Moral decisionsregardless of con-
ditionactivated the insula, MCC and dorsal TPJ, areas essential in
higher order social processes, such as empathy (Singer et al., 2004).
This neural circuitry is well instantiated in the social neuroscience
literature and fits with the findings that moral choices are influenced
by neural systems whose primary role is to facilitate cooperation
(Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). The TPJ has been specifically implicated
in decoding social cues, such as agency, intentionality and the mental
states of others (Young and Saxe, 2008). For example, TPJ activation
correlates with the extent to which another’s intentions are taken into
account (Young and Saxe, 2009) and transiently disrupting TPJ activity
leads to interference with using mental state information to make
moral judgments (Young et al., 2010). Although there is a large
amount of research indicating that the TPJ codes for our ability to
mentalize, there is also evidence that the TPJ activates during atten-
tional switching (Mitchell, 2008). In addition, one study revealed that
patients with lesions to the TPJ do not show domain-specific deficits
for false belief tasks (Apperly et al., 2007). Although these differential
findings suggest that the specific functionality of the TPJ remains un-
clear, we propose that TPJ engagement during real and imagined moral
decisions suggests a similar mentalizing process is at play in both real
and hypothetical moral decision-making: when deciding how much
harm to apply to another, subjects may conscript a mental state rep-
resentation of the Receiver, allowing them to weigh up the potential
consequences of their decision. This neural finding reinforces the role
of the TPJand thus the likely role of mental state reasoning and
inferencein moral reasoning.
However, we also found distinct neural signatures for both real and
imagined moral decisions. In line with the literature, hypothetical
moral decisions were specifically subserved by activations in the PCC
and mPFCregions also implicated in prospection, by which abridged
simulations of reality are generated (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007).
Although the overall pattern of brain activation during these hypothet-
ical moral decisions replicates the moral network identified in previous
research (Greene et al., 2001), the fact that the PCC and mPFC are
activated both during prospection and during hypothetical moral
decision-making implies that this region is recruited for a wide spec-
trum of imagination-based cognition (Hassabis and Maguire, 2009).
Thus, either hypothetical moral decisions and imagination share a
similar network or hypothetical moral decisions significantly rely on
the imperfect systems of prospection and imagination. Further re-
search exploring whether the PCC and mPFC are specific to hypothet-
ical moral decisions, or recruited more generally for imagining future
events, would help clarify their roles within the moral network.
In contrast, real moral decisions differentially recruited the amyg-
dala. These results are consistent with the vast literature implicating the
amygdala in processing social evaluations (Phelps, 2006), emotionally
relevant information (Sander et al., 2003) and salient stimuli (Ewbank
et al., 2009). Research on moral cognition further implicates amygdala
activation in response to aversive moral phenomena (Berthoz et al.,
2006; Kedia et al., 2008; Glenn et al., 2009); however, this finding is not
systematically observed in moral paradigms (Raine and Yang, 2006). In
line with the literature, it is possible that in the Real PvG task the
amygdala is coding the aversive nature of the moral decision; however,
distress ratings indicated that both conditions were perceived as
equally aversive. Accordingly, an alternative interpretation is that the
amygdala is monitoring the salience, relevance and motivational sig-
nificance (Mitchell et al., 2002) of the real moral choice space.
Table 9 Correlation regression for decreasing empathic concern and perspective taking
(Real PvG Decide > Imagine PvG Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Left superior temporal sulcus 38 74 44 4.12
Right superior temporal sulcus 30 74 48 4.12
Left putamen 14 10 2 3.45
dACC 8 36 34 3.30
Right dlPFC 32 6 46 3.27
Left dlPFC 32 4 54 3.22
Left OFC 24 42 2 4.70
Right OFC 30 58 8 4.03
Right dlPFC 30 24 48 3.65
Left dlPFC 24 16 52 3.62
mPFC 16 50 4 3.72
Table 8 Correlation regression for increasing empathic concern (Real PvG Decide >
Imagine PvG Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Subgenal ACC 2 28 2 3.15
A priori ROIs MNI coordinates t-statistic
Subgenal ACCa 6 36 4 3.82
ROI¼ regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from
previous study: aZahn et al. (2009).
Table 11 Correlation regression for increasing similarity ratings (Real PvG Decide >
Imagine PvG Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Left middle frontal gyrus 28 18 44 3.40
MPFC/rACC 4 38 2 3.01
Left Hippocampus 30 40 4 3.16
Table 10 Correlation regression for decreasing similarity ratings (Real PvG Decide >
Imagine PvG Decide)
Region Peak MNI coordinates z value
Right anterior insula 44 28 0 3.19
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Decisions, which produce real aversive consequences (i.e. lose money
or harm another), are far more salient and meaningful than decisions
that do not incur behaviorally relevant outcomes. The amygdala is also
commonly recruited for decisions which rely on social signals to emo-
tionally learn positive and negative associations (Hooker et al., 2006).
It is possible that the amygdala activation found for real moral deci-
sions is signaling reinforcement expectancy information of both the
positively (self-benefit) and negatively (harm to another) valenced
stimuli (Blair, 2007), which then subsequently guides behavior
(Prevost et al., 2011). This theory not only accounts for the differential
behavioral findings between the real and hypothetical conditions but
also it is consistent with the more general theoretical consensus regard-
ing human moral cognition (Moll et al., 2005), which emphasizes how
lower order regions like the amygdala modulate higher order rational
processes (Dalgleish, 2004).
Our fMRI results further indicate that there are dissociable neural
mechanisms underlying selfish and pro-social decisions. In the Real
PvG, decisions that maximized financial benefit (selfish decisions)
correlated with activity in the OFC, dlPFC and dACCregions that
support the integration of reward and value representations
(Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005), specifically monetary gain
(Holroyd et al., 2004) and loss (Bush et al., 2002). Furthermore, the
dACC was found to negatively correlate with empathic concern scores
and positively correlate with self-reported similarity ratings in the Real
PvG task. Together, this suggests that the dACC may be monitoring
conflicting motive states (Etkin et al., 2011). However, the dACC has
been further implicated in a variety of other functions, including emo-
tion regulation (Etkin et al., 2011), and weighing up different compet-
ing choices (Mansouri et al., 2009). Thus, it is equally plausible that the
dACC is processing the conflicting negative emotions involved with
choosing to harm another for self-gain (Amodio and Frith, 2006).
In the PvG task, the morally guided choice is to give up the money
to prevent harm to another. Unlike selfish decisions, such pro-social
decisions showed significantly greater activation in the rACC/mPFC
and right temporal pole, demonstrating that the nature of real moral
decisions can be predicted by dissociable networks within the PFC. The
rACC/mPFC is a structure engaged in generating empathic feelings for
in-group members (Mathur et al., 2010) and for coding feelings of
altruistic guilt and distress during theory of mind tasks (Fletcher
et al., 1995). Clinical data have also shown that lesions to this area
stunt moral emotions, such as compassion, shame and guilt, and con-
tribute to overall deficits in emotional processing (Mendez and
Shapira, 2009). In fact, research has demonstrated the rACC/mPFC
as a region that responds specifically to the aversion of not harming
others (Young and Dungan, 2011). Based on this, we propose that the
rACC/mPFC activation found for pro-social decisions could be attrib-
uted to the empathic response generated by the emotional aversion
(distress) of harming anothera key motivational influence and prox-
imate mechanism of altruistic behavior.
Theorists have pointed to the importance of studying moral cogni-
tion in ecological valid and consequence-driven environments
(Casebeer, 2003; Moll et al., 2005). Our results illustrate that specific
regions of the moral network subserve moral choicesregardless of
whether they are real or imagined. However, we also found a diver-
gence between real moral behavior and hypothetical moral inten-
tionswhich was reflected in the recruitment of differential
neurobiological systems. Thus, if morality is a domain where situ-
ational influences and the impact of imminent, real consequences
can sway our decisions, then it is crucial that cognitive neuroscience
investigate moral decision-making under real conditions. This seems
especially relevant in light of this new neurobiological evidence, sup-
porting what the philosopher Hume presciently noted‘the most lively
thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation’ (Hume, 1977).
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